Berlin after Vico and Herder: Romanticism as the basis of liberalism by Zoido Oses, Paula
102 ACTAS DEL CONGRESO, MADRID NOVIEMBRE 2010 
 
Berlin after Vico and Herder: Romanticism as 
the basis of liberalism   
 
PAULA ZOIDO OSES, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid  
 
In this essay an exploration of the connection between the ideas from the 
Enlightened period and one of the major political currents of our time –
liberalism- will be held. For this, the reading that Isaiah Berlin makes of the 
theories of Vico and Herder defending them from the accusations of relativism 
of which they are a recurrent target will be taken as a starting point.  
 
I have not chosen liberalism as a means of assessing the impact of Romantic 
thought in our days by coincidence, but precisely because I understand 
liberalism –conceived in a specific way but also in its broadest sense- as one of 
the most representative theories of contemporary Western society. Liberalism, 
as will be explained, lays its theoretical base on a compendium of some of the 
most essential values of Western society, and it also exists exclusively as a 
means of preserving these. Thus, if liberalism is an example of the values of our 
society as representative as I understand, assessing the connection between its 
development and the Romantic thought will demonstrate the deep influence of 
the latter on the first. In order to explain this, I will first focus the reading that 
Berlin makes of Vico and Herder’s work to move to the implications of what he 
called value-pluralism. Then I will briefly explain to what extent this value-
pluralism lies in the core of liberalism, and also I will assess how liberalism 
entails the most fundamental values of contemporary Western societies, proving 
the fact that liberalism is nothing else but a reflection of the aspects of the work 
of Vico and Herder that Berlin considered more relevant.  
 
Even though chronologically Vico and Herder are normally placed within the 
framework of the Enlightenment, the conceptualization of history and of human 
societies that they make they stands against it. If the Enlightenment meant the 
sovereignty of reason and a methodical classification of reality, what Vico and 
Herder did was precisely to oppose this, denying the possibility of establishing a 
single human truth as a unit of measure of all the provinces of human thought 
by the application of the laws of the natural sciences. Because of this, they are 
sometimes called relativists- but in the ‘softer’ sense, that is to say, they do not 
deny the possibility of objective knowledge through the natural sciences.  
 
While Vico looked at the development of humanity through its history, Herder 
chose to examine different nationalities and human groups, both aiming to 
achieve a clearer understanding of the world we inhabit. Vico defends the idea 
that each stage of the historical cycle of cultures embodies its own autonomous 
values and its own conception of the world and of its relationship to it, and 
therefore it is only through this view that we could understand them. Each of 
these cultures is for Vico a phase of a providential plan governed by divine 
purpose. However, in this plan there is not a single end or goal towards which 
all the cultures evolve. Each one of this stages can represent an end in itself, 
each culture is autonomous and they cannot be understood in perfectly 
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equivalent terms. This does not imply by any means that no judgment of 
different societies and cultures can be made because everything is relative, but 
on the contrary it means that many objective ends exist, even though these ends 
might vary from one society to another and even appear as incompatible with 
others. What Vico was doing asserting such things was to outline what should be 
seen as the core of value-pluralism: the idea of incommensurability. 
Incommensurability implies that values cannot be weighed or measured, and 
thus it is impossible to establish rational priorities amongst them. It is 
impossible to classify goods or evils as better or worse options, and therefore, as 
stated by Gray: “incommensurability doesn´t mean equality, indifference or 
the insignificance of our choices: it shows the inability of reason to guide our 
actions” (Gray,200:52). Strictly it means that they cannot be measured in terms 
of some finite quantity of a third value – such as utility.  
 
However, it is very easy to see why accusations of relativism are often directed 
against ideas like those of Vico and Herder. To this, Berlin tries to explain that 
they do not hold a relativist view of nature but rather a pluralist view. Pluralism 
does not entail relativism at all, it is not even contrary to radical objectivism, 
since each particular value or goal held by an individual, group or society should 
be regarded as autonomous and equally valid for itself. (Berlin,1990:ch.1).  
 
These values might be regarded in different ways depending on each individual 
or social context, but they still hold a certain degree of universal association. 
Herder states that “each nation has its centre of happiness within itself, just as 
every sphere has its own centre of gravity” (Herder,2002:233): even if that 
centre of gravity varies from one society to another, at least the idea of the 
centre of gravity is universally valid. This is what allows intercultural 
understanding: the existence of certain universal principles that, although not 
always universally appreciated in the same way, are universally recognized. 
However, this cannot be understood as a mere cultural relativism, as it does not 
support an idea of absolute equality and validity of different cultures. Regarding 
this, Berlin states the existence of a minimum degree of humanity, as there is:“a 
limit beyond which we can no longer understand what a given creature is at, 
what kind of rules it follows in its behavior, what its gestures mean. In such 
situations, when the possibility of communication breaks down, we speak of 
derangement, of incomplete humanity”(Berlin,1997:80). This limit is thus 
defined by means of universal cultural –or moral- values: it is only when 
something cannot be universally understood –and to understand something 
does not mean defending it, or sympathizing with it- when it is considered 
inhuman, and therefore, undesirable. If value pluralism was to be a relativist 
theory, everything, even those things that cannot be understood, should be 
tolerated. 
 
Thus, the engagement that Berlin creates between liberalism and value-
pluralism is obvious: if value pluralism is true and all our goals and values are 
incommensurable, and therefore cannot be judged by the means of reason, then 
the best political system possible is the one that does not impose a single 
concept of good, but instead respects the different existent conceptions of it. A 
logical conclusion of this will be, then, what stands as one of the major points of 
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liberalism but also one of the foundations of contemporary mentalities: that no 
rational choice can be made, as there is no single path to follow. Contrary to 
Aristotelian ideas of “good life”, and to utilitarian politics ,a broad variety of 
ways of human flourishing exists, and even these can very often flourish in 
contradictory, mutually excluding forms. However, again, this doesn’t mean 
that everything is equally valid- We act following objective values, even if the 
contents of these values can vary from one moral frame to another. This also 
clashes with any conception of absolute values, such as Kantian or Aristotelian 
ethics.  
 
If value pluralism can be defined as a non-relativist theory, this implies that it 
has to stand for a certain set of principles: the goals proclaimed by value 
pluralism are very clearly defined (Crowder,2002). Value pluralism entails 
liberalism as it creates the perfect conditions for the realization of the value that 
pluralistic ideals signify themselves. And amongst all the values that pluralism 
could support, Berlin speaks of one essential feature of human nature: the 
pursuit each man’s individual convictions. “To realise the relative validity of 
one’s convictions… and yet stand for them unflinchingly, is what distinguishes 
a civilised man from a barbarian.” (Berlin, 1997:172) Value pluralism leads to a 
self-constructivist conception of mankind: a human can only be considered as 
such if it is able to decide amongst a variety of options –and consequently 
rejecting others- creating its own path to follow: here is where the echoes of 
Romanticism can be clearly heard. A man is the result of his choices, which 
should never be imposed or influenced by a higher authority. Hierarchies are to 
be refuted, then. However, since these convictions can only be defended if they 
surpass the minimal limit of human nature, pluralism proves to be objective 
rather than subjective. With value pluralism being an objective theory, it is not 
bold to state that it aims at some concrete goals, and liberalism can be clearly 
identified as the best political system possible when achieving them 
(Crowder,2002).  
 
Liberalism can be defined as “a style of political theory that emphasizes 
individual liberty and views the state as a coercive institution whose principal 
purpose lies in the protection of individuals from interference with their liberty 
from other individuals and from other states” (Talisse,2004:P129). I regard 
liberalism, nonetheless, as a genuinely contemporary Western political ideology, 
inasmuch as it has played a fundamental role forming a society that finds in the 
preservation of the plurality precisely its best unifying tool. When observed 
from the perspective of political theory, Romanticism seems to be, in some way, 
the starting point of contemporary European politics. Nothing else but freedom, 
should be praised, and it cannot be guaranteed that all men stand in a solid 
ground of a shared rationality. This idea is clearly informed by the Romantic 
thought as it places the focus upon the uniqueness of man and tries to preserve 
it above anything else. Thus, from the Enlightenment onwards European 
politics have been based on discord. However, since we acknowledge our 
individuality, and furthermore, because we aim to defend it before anything 
else, we build our common life, our politics, upon the base of reasonable 
disagreement (Tully,2002:207). This implies, of course, that nothing is ever 
clear nor predefined, and moreover, the possibility of finding a single 
EL FONDO DE LA HISTORIA: IDEALISMO, ROMANTICISMO Y SUS REPERCUSIONES 105 
 
satisfactory answer –I will not even dare to call it a correct answer- within a 
social setting of plurality is very unlikely, not to say impossible. This is 
nonetheless a good thing since the fact that dilemmas arise is a sign of liberty, 
inasmuch as they are a mere consequence of the right to choose freely and 
according to individual criteria: it is precisely because ‘we recognize rational 
personal responsibility’ (Popper, 1945:186) that we live in free societies: the 
individual freedom that liberalism wishes to defend implies also the idea of 
individuals being ultimately responsible for their own actions.  
 
This is how free liberal societies- just like in the contemporary Western world- 
work, by embracing and acknowledging diversity and giving each individual the 
same rights and respect: that is to say, by allowing their individual aims to 
flourish and by letting each individual voluntarily decide how to manage their 
own lives. And this kind of ideas are the ones that have shaped the development 
of Western culture since the Romantic period. All in all, if we all agree in 
something it is in the fact that politics is not about truth, but about taking 
decisions in the absence of truth. And I could not think of a better way to 
illustrate the Romantic conceptualization of the world than this acceptance of 
the lack of absolute certainty that is not necessarily a nihilist relativism, but 
rather an open door to a world of endless possibilities and unlimited 
development.  
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